We construct a continuous sovereign debt crisis index for four large Latin American countries for the period 1870-2012. Our sovereign debt crisis index is similar to the Exchange Market Pressure Index for currency crises, and the Money Market Pressure Index for banking crises. To obtain the optimal set of indicators and the optimal value of the threshold for dating crises we apply the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. We calculate our sovereign debt crisis index as a weighted average of three indicators, the debt to GDP ratio, the external interest rate spread and the exports to imports ratio. The continuous index allows a more advanced analysis of sovereign debt crises. We include two applications. In the first application we investigate the relationship between sovereign debt crises and the business cycle in Latin America. Our second application constructs a similar index for five European countries.
Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe has renewed interest in sovereign debt crises. Until now the analysis of sovereign debt crises is limited by the crisis indicator that is traditionally used, which is a binary variable to distinguish debt default periods from non-debt default periods. This may be too restrictive in two ways. First, a continuous index is more informative, and second, a more general definition of a debt crises that allows for debt servicing difficulties-rather than a sovereign debt default index-may enhance the usefulness of such an index. This paper proposes a continuous sovereign debt crises index, where a debt crises, indicating market pressure, differs from a debt default. The construction of the Debt Market Pressure Index (DMPI) is our main contribution to the literature.
To construct a continuous index we combine indicators that show different behavior in times of a debt crisis compared to normal times for the four largest Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, for the period 1870-2012. We have chosen these countries for their long history of sovereign debt crises. In fact, we construct two indices: one for a "wide" definition of sovereign debt crises that includes debt servicing difficulties (market pressure), and one for a "narrow" definition of sovereign debt defaults.
When the DMPI is used a crisis indicator, it has to be combined with a decision rule-a crisis is signaled when the index exceeds a thresholdand compared to a benchmark crisis series. The threshold is determined by the trade-off between missed crises and false alarms-each having its own cost. We apply the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve to find simultaneously the optimal set of indicators and the value of the threshold.
We find that for our sample of four Latin American economies over a long time span the DMPI for debt crises that replicated best the benchmark debt crisis series consists of debt-to-GDP, imports-to-exports, and external spread.
The best DMPI for debt defaults consists of debt-to-GDP and imports-toexports. The difference is the external spread indicator that does indicate market pressure, but not debt default.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a review of theoretical and empirical literature on sovereign debt crises in Section 2, Section 3 describes the design of our new crisis index, weights and threshold.
The data are presented in Section 4, followed by the results in Section 5.
We present applications of our market pressure index in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Literature
Standard and Poor's rates sovereign issuers in default if a government fails to meet principal or interest payment on external obligation on due date, or when a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is at less favorable terms than the original obligation. This traditional definition of debt crises-focusing on defaults-does not capture all debt-servicing difficulties.
1 A country may avoid a default through a large financial package from the IMF, as was the case in Mexico and Argentina in 1995 , and in Brazil in 1998 -1999 and 2001 -2002 . Therefore Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003 extend the debt crisis definition to account for large financial packages from the IMF (see Appendix A). According to Sy (2003) and Pescatori and Sy (2007) the relative low number of sovereign debt crises since the 1990s can partly be attributed to the definition of debt crises. Default on debt was common in the 1980s, but since bond markets developed strongly in the mid 1990s the number of debt defaults has diminished, while numerous countries faced difficulties in their debt servicing.
Our crisis identification procedure is based on the idea underlying the Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI) which was introduced by Girton and Roper (1977) , and used by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) to identify currency crises. The EMPI not only captures significant currency depreciations, but also periods where the exchange rate is under pressure, and defended by depleting foreign reserves and/or increasing interest rates. Similarly, we extend the traditional focus on sovereign debt default to sovereign debt crises by including periods of debt servicing difficulties which puts a pressure on the market for sovereign debt.
The indicators we select to construct the DMPI are based on the theoretical literature on sovereign debt crises, notably the sudden stop model of Calvo (2003) , and Arellano's (2008) incarnation of the reputation model of sovereign default of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) . These models will be discussed briefly below.
2 2 Another body of literature (for instance Minsky, 1986, and 1992) builds upon the ideas of Keynes. This literature focuses on institutions and lack of control mechanisms. Only when control mechanisms (i.e. regulation, interventions) are installed, the capitalist economy can be stable for a longer period, which allows institutional evolution and sustainable economic growth. Control mechanisms are not static: controls and interventions become
In the sudden stop model of Calvo (2003) a high government debt and current account deficit financed by capital flows can trigger a sudden stop, which can cause a balance of payment (BOP) crisis. In the case of debt denominated in foreign currency (original sin), a depreciation of the currency will increase the probability of a sovereign debt default.
Recently new versions of the seminal model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) were developed to cope with empirical evidence from emerging economies.
One of these new models is Arellano (2008) : endogenous time-varying default probabilities influence interest rate spreads, which affect economic output. In booms debt is cheap and borrowing is abundant, and the trade balance is negative. In recessions the probability of default increases, which increases interest rates.
Recent empirical research on sovereign debt suggests that the debt-to-GDP ratio is a strong indicator for sovereign defaults in emerging economies (Manasse and Roubini, 2009; Furceri and Zdzienicki, 2012) . Borensztein and Panizza (2009) observe that credit ratings and external interest rate spreads surge in the first years of a debt default. Another indicator is the current account (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006) , which typically reverses in times of a debt crisis. Since the overall balance of payments (trade balance and capital balance) must always be zero, a country that attracts large capital inflows will necessarily run a trade deficit (Krugman 1996) . A reversal in capital flows is therefore always accompanied by an opposite reversal in the trade balance.
less effective over time, as agents innovate to avoid restrictions on their profitable activities. These mechanisms are difficult to quantify, so in this paper we assume no changes in regulation and interventions. Aiolfi, Catão and Timmermann (2011) describe in a narrative way the relation between sovereign debt crises and business cycle turning points for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico during the period 1870-2004. We contribute to the literature by applying our crisis index to analyse the relation in a more formal way.
Method
To build a debt market pressure index (DMPI) we need to select indicators, weights and thresholds similarly to the construction of an exchange market pressure index for currency crises or a money market pressure index for banking crises (see Appendix B).
Construction of the DMPI
We construct different debt crisis indices, with different combinations of indicators suggested by the literature. All indicators are transformed when required to avoid non-stationarity, and standardized per country. resp. Index i refers to the country (1 = Argentina, 2 = Brazil, 3 = Chile, 4 = Mexico), and t refers to the observation (t = 1, . . . , T ). For the weights we follow Eichengreen et al. (1995) by taking inverted standard deviations
The DM P I i t 's are pooled and standardized, such that we obtain a vector of size 4T .
We construct two crisis indices:
• DMPI: "broad" definition-debt crises. Refers to defaults and debt servicing difficulties that require significant IMF assistance.
• DMPI-: "narrow" definition-debt default. Refers to defaults only.
DMPI as a crisis indicator
The DMPI identifies periods with increased pressure on debt servicing. However, we have no benchmark that captures debt servicing difficulties. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of the continuous index as a crisis indicator we convert the index into a binary variable such that we can compare our index with a benchmark. If the index exceeds a pre-established threshold, then a crises is signaled and the value of 1 is assigned to the binary variable, and zero otherwise. The higher the threshold, the less exceedences are to be expected. This will result in less false alarms (type I error), but also in more missed crises (type II error). The optimal threshold depends on the relative cost of the two error types. To determine the optimal threshold we do a grid search over the interval [-2.5; 2.5] in steps of 0.1 times the standard deviation of the DMPI and we compare the crisis signals to a published benchmark crisis indicator series.
For each country and each period the constructed crisis signal dummy is compared with the benchmark crisis dummy. For each threshold we construct a contingency table as in Table 1 . Contingency tables can be constructed both for debt crises (the "broad" definition) and for debt defaults (the "narrow" definition). 
Notes.
• n 1 : number of observations in which the model signals a crisis that actually took place: correct crisis signals (TP: True Positive)
• n 2 : number of observations in which the model signals a crisis that did not take place: false alarms (FP: False Positive)
• n 3 : number of observations in which the model does not signal a crisis that actually took place: missed crises (FN: False Negative)
• n 4 : number of observations in which the model does not signal a crisis that did not take place: correct non-crisis signals (TN: True Negative)
The ROC curve
In signal detection theory a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a graphical illustration of the performance of a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied. The ROC curve was first developed by electrical engineers and radar engineers during World War II for detecting enemy objects in battlefields and was soon introduced to psychology to account for perceptual detection of stimuli. One application in economics is Berge and Jordà (2011) to evaluate the performance of their business cycle indicator. They argue that ". . . A major advantage of the ROC curve is that it is not tied to a specific loss function as it itself is a map of the entire space of trade-offs for a given classification problem. The ROC curve can be estimated non-parametrically and ROC-based summary statistics have large sample Gaussian distributions that make formal inference convenient . . . " (Berge and Jordà, 2011, p249) We apply the method to calibrate our crisis index, and the threshold in the decision rule.
The Total Positive Rate (TPR), or ROC(c) is defined as n 1 /(n 1 + n 3 ),
i.e. the percentage of correct crisis predictions relative to the total number of crises. The TPR depends on the threshold c. A high TPR means that the model predicts the crises well, while a low TPR implies that the model misses crises. TPR is also known as the sensitivity or recall rate, the power of the test, or 1 minus the Type II error.
The other principal statistic indicator is the False Positive Rate (FPR), or r(c), which is defined as the percentage of false alarms relative to the total number of non-crisis years: n 2 /(n 2 + n 4 ). FPR equals 1 minus the specificity, or the Type I error, the size of the test. A high FPR means that the model predicts crises that do not take place, and a low FPR implies that the model correctly does not predict a crisis. In the remainder of this paper we use ROC and r to indicate the Total Positive rate and the False Positive Rate, respectively. There are various way to evaluate the predictions of binary variables: the Area under the Curve, and as a special case the Youden index, and the utility approach. We apply the utility approach for reasons that will be discussed below.
AUROC

One of the methods to evaluate predictions of binary variables is the Area
Under the ROC (AUROC), calculated as the integral of the ROC curve. A perfect classifier has an AUROC value of 1; a non-discriminant classifier has an AUROC value 0.5. The classifier that generates the highest AUROC is considered best. Berge and Jordà (2011) use this measure to evaluate the classification of the business cycle.
The main advantage of the AUROC is its objectivity: there is no arbitrary judgment on what weighs heavier-a false alarm or a missed crisis. However, this is at the same time a disadvantage, because in reality missed crises may be considered more important than false warnings (Lobo, Jimenez-Valverde and Real, 2008) .
Various refinements have been proposed among which Jordà and Taylor (2009) who extend the ROC with the argument that an indicator that correctly classifies many events with low costs but misses a key event that generates a devastating loss will be less desirable than an indicator that is equally accurate on average but correctly classifies the large events. They attach little weight to wrong signals when the costs are small; but when costs are large they penalize classifiers for not picking events, and reward classifiers for picking events. We assume that missed crises have higher costs than false alarms, and correctly predicting crises is more important than correctly predicting periods of tranquility.
Youden index
The Youden index is a special case of the AUROC. In 1884, Charles Sanders Peirce introduced a measure for evaluating predictions of a binary outcome:
"the science of the method " (Baker and Kramer, 2007) . The Youden index (Youden, 1950) , as it was baptized, is defined as J ≡ ROC − r = sensitivity + specificity − 1.
The optimal point is found were J is maximized, which corresponds to the point on the ROC curve that maximizes the vertical distance between the ROC curve and the diagonal.
Utility
To determine the combination of indicators and the threshold that generate the best possible outcome we may also turn to a utility function. This method was first introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1884 (Baker and Kramer, 2007) . After assigning utility values to correct and incorrect model outcomes, we compute the overall utility of the classification
where U ij is the utility associated with prediction i, given the true state j; U 11 is the utility of a correctly predicted crisis; U 01 is the utility of a missed crisis; U 10 is the utility of a false alarm; and U 00 is the utility of a correctly predicted non-crisis episode; and π is the unconditional probability of observing a crisis.
The utility is maximized by taking the first derivative of the utility function with respect to r, the false positive rate. After rearranging we obtain
So, the optimum is the point where the slope of the ROC curve equals the expected marginal rate of substitution between the net utility of accurate non-crisis and crisis prediction. If the ROC curve is continuous and concave, the optimum is the point where the slope of the ROC curve equals s. More generally, the optimum on the ROC curve is the point on the ROC curve that intersects the line with slope s that has the largest intercept and hence the largest utility for that slope (Baker and Kramer, 2007) .
If the loss-to-profit ratio (U 00 − U 10 )/(U 11 − U 01 ) is large or the outcome rare (π small), the slope will be steep and the optimal operating point will occur at a small value of FPR. This is the case when false alarms are relatively expensive compared to missed crises. If the loss-to-profit ratio is smaller or the outcome is more common, the slope will be less steep and the optimal operating point will occur at a larger FPR value. This is the case when missed crises are relatively 'expensive' compared to false alarms.
Data
We use an unbalanced panel consisting of four large Latin American economies Table 2 ).
• DMPI-(debt defaults index): the benchmark consists of debt defaults according to Standard and Poor's (column (1) in Table 2 ).
For both benchmarks we use an exclusion window of two years, which implies that debt crises with two years intervals or shorter are considered the same crisis. 1890 -1893 , 1982 -1993 , 2001 -2005 1995 1890 -1893 , 1982 -1995 , 2001 -2005 Brazil 1898 -1901 , 1902 -1910 , 1914 -1919 , 1931 -1933 , 1937 -1943 , 1983 -1994 1998 -1999 , 2001 -2002 1898 -1910 , 1914 -1919 , 1931 -1933 , 1937 -1943 , 1983 -1994 , 1998 -2002 Chile 1880 -1883 , 1931 -1947 , 1983 -1990 -1880 -1883 , 1931 -1947 , 1983 -1990 Mexico 1866 -1885 , 1914 -1922 , 1928 -1942 , 1982 -1990 1995 1914 -1922 , 1928 -1942 , 1982 -1990 , 1995 Note. Descriptions of the definitions can be found in Appendix A.
Results
For the DMPI index both the utility and the Youden index select the same combination of indicators as the optimal one: the external interest spread, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of exports to imports. The selected indicators are confirmed by the sudden stop model: a high debt-to GDP ratio makes a country vulnerable for debt crises, and the current account reverses when a crisis unfolds. External spread increases in times of debt crises, which is in accordance with Arellano (2008) . Government expenditures, the fiscal budget, the terms of trade, and (changes in) the political system do not contribute to a better performance of the debt crisis indicator. For the four countries Figure 2 shows the DMPI and the benchmark crisis dummy.
The benchmark crisis dummy is 1 if there is a debt crisis according to the "broad" definition. A peak in the DMPI implies increased pressure on the debt servicing. We can see that our debt crisis indicator shows peaks at the time of the debt crises, except the Mexican debt crisis in the 1930s. We also observe that our indicator has peaks that are not associated with debt crises, such as Argentina in the 1940s and Chile in the 1970s. In the overall utility of the classification as shown in Equation (2) in Section 3.3 we use U 11 = 1, U 00 = 1, U 10 = −1, and a range for U 01 :
−1, −2, −3, . . . , −10. The motivation behind this non-symmetric treatment is that we assume that missed crises are more costly than false alarms. The more negative U 01 , the more a missed crisis is punished compared to false alarms. Figure 3 shows the utility value for different values of U 01 . 
Choosing the penalty for missed crisis is arbitrary. We apply two criteria:
(i) the threshold should not be negative, and (ii) the cost of a missed crisis should be higher than the cost of a false alarm.
We find two optimal thresholds for different penalties for a missed crisis:
1. Mild penalty for missed crises (U 01 = -2): the optimal threshold is 0.5 times the standard deviation. This results in the following contingency Comparison of the contingency tables shows that increasing the threshold decreases the number of false alarms, but at the cost of an increase in the number of missed crises. The performance of DMPI against the benchmark for debt crises is shown in Table 3 . Column (2) lists the identified debt crises for a relatively high penalty for missed crises, and column (3) for a relatively mild penalty for missed crises.
In our analysis of the results we will focus on a threshold of 0.5 (the last column of Table 3 -1932 -1937 -Argentina -1941 -1946 1943 -1945 Argentina -1975 -1979 1976 -1978 Argentina 1982 -1995 1982 -1991 , 1995 1982 -1991 Argentina 2001 -2005 2001 2001 Brazil -1889 -1890 1889 -1890 Brazil 1898 -1910 1898 -1909 1900 -1905 , 1909 Brazil 1914 -1919 1914 -1916 1914 -1915 Brazil -1922 -1923 -Brazil 1931 -1933 , 1937 -1943 1930 -1945 1931 -1945 Brazil 1983 -1994 , 1998 -2002 1981 -2006 1982 -2005 Chile  1880-1883  1878-1882  1879-1880  Chile  -1898-1899  1898  Chile 1931 -1947 1915 -1950 1915 -1917 , 1931 -1946 Chile -1969 -1977 1973 -1976 Chile 1983 -1990 1983 -1991 1983 -1988 Mexico -1896 -1897 -Mexico 1914 -1922 1909 -1927 1913 -1918 , 1924 Mexico 1928 -1940 1931 -1943 1934 -1935 , 1943 Mexico 1982 -1990 1982 -1990 1982 -1989 Mexico 1995 1995 -1999 1995 -1996 uation in Chile. In Argentina a period of frauds in the 1930s was followed by revolutionary reforms in the Peronist era starting in 1943. In the mid 1970s both Argentina and Chile experienced military coups, started market reforms experiments and suffered from (very) high inflation (Ocampo and Ros, 2009 ).
We now turn to the debt default index, DMPI-. Both the utility and the Youden index select the same optimal combination of indicators: the debt-to-GDP ratio and the ratio of exports to imports. Compared to the debt crisis index DMPI, the external spread does not play a significant role any more.
This confirms the findings of Pescatori and Sy (2007) 
Applications
An advantage of a continuous index as opposed to a binary variable is that more information is included in the index. Furthermore, it enables testing for endogeneity or causality between sovereign debt crises and economic growth and/or business cycles, and between sovereign debt crises and currency and banking crises. We also see opportunities to use the DMPI indices in Early Warning System approaches. We discuss two applications of our continuous sovereign debt crisis index. As a first application we analyse the relation between business cycles and sovereign debt crises for four Latin American countries, and show impulse response functions based on a two-variable VAR model. Granger causality tests indicate that the business cycle Grangercauses debt crises at the 5% significance level.
In the second illustration we apply the methodology of constructing a DMPI-using the same indicators as we do for the Latin American countriesto a number of European countries that face sovereign debt problems some years after the burst of the housing bubble in the United States in 2007.
To do this we select the same indicators as we do for the Latin American countries. Our index shows a sharp increase for Portugal, Ireland and Greece after 2008, which are the countries that received assistance from the IMF and the ECB.
Sovereign debt crises and business cycles
As mentioned in the Introduction an advantage of a continuous index as opposed to a binary variable is that it enables additional analysis, e.g. testing for endogeneity or causality between sovereign debt crises and economic growth and/or business cycles, and between sovereign debt crises and currency and banking crises. We perform an econometric analysis for the rela- The two-variable VAR with eight lags is stable which implies that the impulse response functions are valid. According to the block exogeneity Wald Response of DMPI to DMPI
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations -2 S.E.
(Chi-square) test Granger causality is uni-directional at a level of significance of 5%. Accordingly, we assume that contemporaneous Granger causality runs from business cycle index disturbance to a debt crisis index disturbance and not the other way around (this implies a recursive order on the reduced form disturbances, also known as a Cholesky decomposition). Figure 5 shows that a one standard deviation shock to BCS lowers DMPI for two periods, and this increases DMPI in periods 4-7. So, a positive shock to economic activity reduces the probability of a debt crisis for two years.
After about four periods the debt crisis index increases while at the same time the business cycle experiences a downturn. A one standard deviation shock to the DMPI lowers BCS in the second period after the shock, and remains unchanged thereafter. The DMPI itself slowly returns to neutral. According to the Granger causality test Granger causality is bi-directional at a 10% level of significance, so we present a sensitivity analysis with a reversed Cholesky ordering in which contemporaneous Granger causality runs from debt crisis index disturbance to a business cycle index disturbance. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 6 .
Reversing the Cholesky ordering leads to the conclusion that a one standard deviation shock to BCS increases DMPI after the second period. The increase in the debt crisis index shock peaks in period seven when the econ-omy is in a downturn. A one standard deviation shock to DMPI lowers BCS in the first two periods, but this response is short-lived.
What about Europe?
In the Introduction we mentioned that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe The graph clearly shows that the index signals debt servicing problems in three out of five countries, namely Portugal, Ireland and Greece. These are the same countries that indeed needed assistance. In Portugal and Greece the index drops in 2012, whereas in Portugal it is increasing. In Italy and
Spain the index also increases, but the level is much lower than in the other three countries. Therefore, the same indicators that have been identified to be important for debt servicing problems in Latin America also seem to be relevant for the European countries.
Conclusion
We construct a continuous sovereign debt crisis index for four large Latin
American countries for the period 1870-2012, similar to indices for currency crises, and more recently for banking crises. Applying the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curve we determine the optimal sovereign debt crisis index and the threshold. For a "broad" definition of a debt crisis (DMPI) the optimal combination is debt-to-GDP ratio, external interest rate spread, and exports-to-imports ratio. The benchmark for this index consists of default according to Standard and Poor's, complemented by periods when IMF assistance was required. The optimal threshold is 0.5 times the standard deviation when missed crises have a relatively lower cost (defined as 2 times the costs of a false alarm), or 0.1 when missed crises have a relatively high cost (defined as 4 to 5 times the costs of a false alarm). For a "narrow" definition of a debt crisis (DMPI-) the optimal combination is debt-to-GDP ratio, and exports-to-imports ratio. The benchmark for this index is default as defined by Standard and Poor's. The optimal threshold is 0.2 times the standard deviation.
The indicators we select are similar to the ones that feature in the models of Arellano (2008) and Calvo (2003) . The probability of default is positively correlated with the interest rates, and thus interest rate spread. In sudden stops, debt-to-GDP ratio tend to be high. This debt overhang will remain high until the debt is restructured, which typically last long. Furthermore, in a sudden stop capital inflows reverse, which is reflected by an increase in exports relative to imports.
The DMPI index performs well in terms of missed crises: it does not miss any debt crisis period, although in various crises our constructed crisis dummy does not identify the entire debt crisis period. Our index generates many false signals, yet all these periods can be traced down to high volatility in the region (debt crises in neighboring countries), sharp drops in commodity prices or major political events (military coups).
In this paper we illustrate the relationship between the business cycle index and the debt crisis index in a two-variable VAR model. The impulse responses show that a positive shock to economic activity reduces the probability of a debt crisis for two years.
As a second illustration we show that using the same indicators that • Standard and Poor's rates sovereign issuers in default if a government fails to meet principal or interest payment on external obligation on due date, or when a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is at less favorable terms than the original obligation.
• Beim and Calomiris (2001) define a crisis when all or part of interest and/or principal payments due were reduced or rescheduled. They consider bonds, supplier's credit, and bank loans to sovereign nations and exclude intergovernmental loans.
• Detragiache and Spilimbergo ( • Ciarlone and Trebeschi (2005) define a country default if one of five conditions occur, including the receipt of a large assistance package from the IMF, and a debt restructuring or rescheduling agreement with an official and/or commercial creditor. In most, but not all cases, restructurings occur after a default, but it is also possible that a restructuring occurs prior to a probable default, which is labeled as a "preemptive debt restructuring" (Das et al. , 2012) .
• In Sy (2003) a debt crisis occurs when bond spreads are trading 1,000 basis points or more above U.S. Treasuries. The threshold is chosen as it is considered a psychological barrier for investors. The problem is that the data do not always fit this rigid definition: some Asian countries did not even exceed the threshold in the Asia crisis, while various Latin American countries exceed the threshold also in tranquil times. As an alternative, they take the 90th percentile, acknowledging that countries without debt problems will also be included.
• Pescatori and Sy (2007) define debt crises as events occurring when either a country defaults or when its bond spreads are above a critical threshold. For the critical threshold they use a rate of 1,000 basis points, based on Extreme Value Theory and the Kernel Density estimation, with the 90th percentile of the fitted distribution.
B Currency and banking crisis indicators Currency crises: Exchange Market Pressure Index
Based on the Girton and Roper (1977) , and ∆ r − r U S respectively. The index US is the reference country, in this case USA.
When the index exceeds a predetermined threshold (two standard deviations above the mean), then a crisis is identified. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) made an adjusted version, and later various variations emerged (for an overview see Lestano and Jacobs, 2007) . where i refers to country i, t refers to time, ∆ is the difference operator, rd is the ratio of central bank reserves to total bank deposits, s is the shortterm real interest rate, σ ∆rd and σ ∆s are the standard deviations from ∆rd and ∆s respectively. To identify a banking crises Von Hagen and Ho (2007) use two criteria: the M M P I exceeds the 98.5 percentile of the sample for the country under study, and the increase of the M M P I compared to the previous period is at least 5%.
